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INTRODUCTION 
Gurdev Cheema i s  a devout K halsa Sik h. A central tenet of the 
Sik h fai th requi res Ms. Cheema and her t hree chi ldren to bear fi ve 
symbols of thei r fai th at all ti mes: "k es" (long hai r) ,  a "k angha" 
(comb), "k achch" (sacred underwear), a "k ara" (steel bracelet), and a 
"ki rp an" (ceremoni al k ni fe ).1  
* Thanks to the Michigan Law Review Notes Office for their editorial assistance. 
Thanks also to Professor James Boyd White of the Michigan Law School for his helpful 
comments and ideas. An earlier version of this Note won the Alliance Defense Fund's 
William Pew Religious Freedom Scholarship Competition. 
1. Cheema v. Thompson, 67 F.3d 883, 884 (9th Cir. 1995). 
2209 
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I n  1994, the Li vi ngston, Cali forni a school di stri ct banned k ni ves -
ki rp ans i ncluded - from all p ubli c  schools. Any student who fai led to 
comp ly wi th the ban was threatened wi th exp ulsi on.2 Ms. Cheema's 
three chi ldren were all enrolled i n  Li vi ngston p ubli c schools at the 
ti me, so Ms. Cheema faced three unattracti ve choi ces: (1) her chi ldren 
could vi olate a central tenet of thei r  reli gi on and attend school wi thout 
thei r ki rp ans; (2) her chi ldren could vi olate thei r school's i nstructi ons 
and face exp ulsi on; or (3) she could k eep her chi ldren at home and fi le 
a lawsui t  agai nst the school i n  order to force the board to grant her 
chi ldren an excep ti on.3 She chose the last op ti on. 
Fortunately for Ms. Cheema, she eventually p revai led i n  court and 
her chi ldren were p ermi tted to return to school wi th thei r ki rp ans. 4 
Central to her success was the Reli gi ous Freedom Restorati on Act 
(RFRA), whi ch mandated that state governments may not burden a 
p erson's free exerci se of reli gi on unless the governmental acti on was 
the least restri cti ve alternati ve and served a comp elli ng i nterest.5 The 
Sup reme Court subsequently struck down the p art of the RFRA that 
app li ed to the states.6 
Cases lik e  Ms. Cheema's are exp ected to become even more 
common wi th the i nflux of p rograms whi ch are lik ely to offend certai n  
fai ths, such as school uni forms7 and sexual health courses.8 Wi th thi s  
p otenti al i ncrease i n  di sp utes there has been a decrease i n  judi ci al 
clari ty on how to handle such cases.9 The reason for the murki ness has 
much to do wi th a rapi d reconfi gurati on of the Fi rst Amendment's 
2. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 48915(a)(2) (West 2003) (requiring a recommendation of 
expulsion for the possession of a knife of no reasonable purpose to the pupil). 
Id. 
3. Cheema, 67 F.3d at 884-85. 
4. Id. at 886. 
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l (2000). The RFRA stated: 
(a) In general: Government shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion 
even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except as provided in 
subsection (b) of this section. (b} Exception: Government may substantially burden a 
person's exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the 
person - (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least 
restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. 
6. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (invalidating the RFRA because 
Congress overstepped its authority under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
7. See Hicks v. Halifax County Bd. of Educ., 93 F. Supp. 2d 649, 653 (E.D.N.C. 1999). In 
Hicks, a custodial great-grandmother objected to the School Board's uniform policy on 
religious grounds because she claimed the policy eliminated all free will and was required by 
the anti-Christ. Id. 
8. See Leebaert v. Harrington, 193 F. Supp. 491, 497 (D. Conn. 2002). 
9. See, e.g., Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 165 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(discussing confusion), rev'd en bane, 220 F.3d 1 134 (2000). 
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Free Exerci se Clause1 0  juri sp rudence over the p ast fi fteen years and 
corresp ondi ng jousti ng between the Sup reme Court and Congress. 
From 1963 through 1990, the Sup reme Court emp loyed what was 
termed a "stri ct scruti ny" test for free exerci se challenges.11 The Court, 
i n  Employment Division Department of Human Resources v. Smith, 
abandoned thi s test i n  1990 and rep laced i t  wi th a much less restri cti ve 
one.1 2  I n  Smith, the Court confronted the questi on of whether 
Oregon's cri mi nal law agai nst p eyote use was consti tuti onal as app li ed 
to members of the Nati ve Ameri can Church who smok ed p eyote for 
reli gi ous p urp oses.1 3  The Court found that the law was consti tuti onal 
and held that the Free Exerci se Clause does not reli eve i ndi vi duals of 
the obli gati on to comp ly wi th neutral laws that i nci dentally p roscri be 
conduct mandated by the i ndi vi dual's reli gi on or requi re conduct that 
i s  p rohi bi ted.14 As long as a law i s  "generally app li cable" and not 
desi gned wi th mali ce towards reli gi ous p racti ce and i s  an area that the 
state i s  free to regulate, governments wi ll not usually be requi red to 
p rovi de exemp ti ons to reli gi ous objectors.1 5  The Court further noted 
that wi thout such a rule, there would be a "system i n  whi ch each 
consci ence i s  a law unto i tself or i n  whi ch judges wei gh the soci al 
i mp ortance of all laws agai nst the centrali ty of all reli gi ous beli efs. "1 6 
The Court i mp li ed that thi s  rule was i n  fact not really "new" because 
i n  the p ast the Court only held generally app li cable laws to be 
i napp li cable when the Free Exerci se Clause was acti ng "i n conjuncti on 
wi th other consti tuti onal p rotecti ons. " 17 
Ei ghteen years before Smith, i n  the archetypi cal free exerci se case, 
Wisconsin v. Yoder,18 the Sup reme Court had held that Ami sh p arents 
10. The Free Exercise Clause is found within the Constitution's First Amendment: 
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the 
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." 
U.S. CONST. amend. I .  
11. See Wisconsin v.  Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); see also Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 
398 (1963) (stating that the government may not burden a person's free exercise of religion 
unless the burden advanced a compelling governmental interest and was the least restrictive 
means of accomplishing that interest). In practice, however, the test was often not that strict. 
See infra notes 195-207 and accompanying text. 
12. See Employment Div. Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
13. Id. at 874. 
14. Id. at 878. This decision inspired fierce attack by many academics. For a 
comprehensive history of Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence and a critique of Smith, see 
Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1109 (1990). 
15. Smith, 494 U.S. at 879. 
16. Id. at 890. 
17. Id. at 881. 
18. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
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had a right to v iolate a state compulsory schooling law because the law 
v iolated the parents' f ree exercise rights.19 With Yoder, the Court 
reaff irmed its v iew that ev en generally applicable laws must 
sometimes giv e way to indiv idual free exercise rights. I n  Smith, J ustice 
Scalia' s  opinion f or the Court rejected much of Yoder's f orce and 
instead distinguished the case because it represented a "hybrid 
situation" in which both parental rights20 and free exercise rights were 
at stake.21 The claimants in Smith on the other hand, presented a "f ree 
exercise claim unconnected with any communicativ e activ ity or 
parental right."22 
Smith completely changed the landscape of free exercise 
jurisprudence.23 Although the Court created what has come to be 
known as a "hybrid rights exception,"24 it shed v ery little light on the 
scope of hybrid rights and how these claims should be treated in the 
f uture.25 Congress, unhappy with the decision in Smith and unwilling 
to rely on any hybrid rights exception, decided to take action. I n  1994, 
19. Id. at 219 ("enforcement of the State's requirement of compulsory formal education 
after the eighth grade would gravely endanger if not destroy the free exercise of 
respondents' religious beliefs."). 
20. See infra notes 36-42 and accompanying text for a discussion of parental rights as 
fundamental under the Constitution. 
21. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881 n.l. Professor McConnell suggests that the creation of a 
hybrid right was simply a means to distinguish Yoder. McConnell, supra note 14, at 1 121 
("One suspects that the notion of 'hybrid' claims was created for the sole purpose of 
distinguishing Yoder in this case."). Other prominent commentators have echoed this view. 
See Douglas Laycock, Free Exercise and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 62 
FORDHAM L. REV. 883, 902 (1994) ("Justice Scalia had only five votes. He apparently 
believed he couldn't overrule anything, and so he didn't. He distinguished everything away 
instead."). 
22. Smith, 494 U.S. at 882. 
23. E.g. , McConnell, supra note 14, at 1 1 10-11 .  The Smith Court also stated that it was 
not overruling Sherbert v. Verner, which first announced the Free Exercise Clause's strict 
scrutiny test. Id. Although the Court distinguished Sherbert because Sherbert did not involve 
a claimant who broke a law, Smith still put to rest the notion that free exercise challenges 
should always be granted strict scrutiny. 
24. See, e.g., Grace United Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne, 235 F. Supp. 2d 1186, 
1202 (D. Wyo. 2002) (recognizing a '"hybrid rights' exception to neutral and generally 
applicable regulation of religious conduct"). In order to comprehend the potential power of 
the exception, consider two cases decided by the Michigan Supreme Court on the same day. 
In one, the Court used strict scrutiny to strike down two parents' convictions for home­
schooling their child because their parental right was reinforced with a free exercise claim. 
People v. Dejonge, 501 N.W.2d 127, 134 (Mich. 1993). In the other case, the Court used a 
low level of scrutiny in disallowing secular parents the right to home-school their children. 
People v. Bennett, 501 N.W.2d 106, 115 (Mich. 1993). The only material difference between 
the cases was the lack of a free exercise claim in Bennett that would have created a hybrid 
right. See Roderick Hills, Jr., The Constitutional Rights of Private Governments, 78 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 144, 172 n.92 (2003) (noting how the Michigan Supreme Court rejected the parents' 
claim in Bennett because it was not connected to a free exercise claim). 
25. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 881 n.1 (describing hybrid situations but failing to elaborate 
on how lower courts should address such situations in the future). 
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Congress passed legislation through the RFRA that intended to once 
again compel states to grant religious exemptions to generally 
applicable laws and return f ree exercise jurisprudence to the pre-Smith 
status quo.26 
The RFRA was Congress' s  attempt to f orce courts to apply stricter 
scrutiny when states incidentally burdened religious f reedom.27 The 
RFRA ev aded Smith by creating a statutory av enue through which a 
claimant could attack a generally applicable law independent of the 
Free Exercise Clause;28 it was not so much an attempt by Congress to 
ov errule the Supreme Court' s Smith decision as it was an attempt to 
make the decision irrelev ant. 29 This congressional sidestep was short 
liv ed. In City of Boerne, just three years af ter President Clinton signed 
the RFRA, the Supreme Court struck down the act as it applied to 
states as an unconstitutional ov erstepping of Congress' s power under 
the enabling prov ision of the Fourteenth Amendment.30 
Af ter City of Boerne, parents like Ms. Cheema could no longer 
brin g a f ree exercise challenge coupled with a RFRA challenge against 
a school board. A number of states, howev er, passed their own 
v ersions of the RFRA that hav e  made it easier f or parents and other 
claimants in those respectiv e states.31 Similarly, a f ew state supreme 
courts hav e  held that their state constitutions require a stricter test f or 
26. 42 u.s.c. § 2000bb-1 (2000). 
27. 42 u.s.c. § 2000bb. 
28. For example, even if a claim failed under the Free Exercise Clause, a claimant could 
still claim a right to an exemption under the RFRA. See Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. 
Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909, 921 (Cal. 1996). 
29. See William W. Van Alstyne, The Failure of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
Under Section 5 of the Founeenth Amendment, 46 DUKE L.J. 291, 309-11 (1996). Van 
Alstyne opined: 
[T)he directive (of the RFRA) is to dictate the legal effect courts are to give to any party's 
free exercise claim - directing the court to give it the legal effect appropriate in Congress's 
view (as stipulated in the statute), contrary to the judicial understanding of the Free Exercise 
Clause. The RFRA means (and declares that it means) to make the alleged "right" of the 
complaining party carry more by way of entitlement than the Court has declared the 
Constitution provides. It does not put too fine a point on the matter to say that the RFRA is 
meant to make the Jack of a meritorious First Amendment claim (an "unmeritorious" claim, 
in the Supreme Court's view) utterly irrelevant. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
30. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) ("Broad as the power of Congress 
is under the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, RFRA contradicts vital 
principles necessary to maintain separation of powers and the federal balance."). 
31 .  The language of state RFRAs is similar to the original federal RFRA in that they 
typically require that the government follow a compelling state interest/least restrictive 
means standard. See ALA. CONST. of 1901, amend. 622 (1999); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-
1493.01 (2003); CONN. GEN STAT. ANN. 52-571b (West 2003); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 761.03 
(West 2002); IDAHO CODE § 73-402 (Michie 2003); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 35/15 (2003); N.M. 
STAT. ANN. § 28-22-3 (Michie 2003); 51  OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 253 (2002); 71 PA. CONS. 
STAT. § 2404 (2003); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-80.1-3 (2002); S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-32-40 (2002); 
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 110.001 (Vernon 2003). 
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religious claims.32 N onetheless, in a state in which neither the court nor 
the legislature has recognized the need f or higher scrutiny (which a 
strong majority hav e  not),33 parents are f orced to rely on Smith's 
hybrid language when searching f or a way to exempt their children 
f rom certain neutral school actions which inf ringe upon their f ree 
exercise of religion. 
Parents wishing to assert their parental rights to direct the religious 
upbringing of their children must rely on Smith's discussion of Yoder 
and "hybrid situations."34 I n  addition to the Free Exercise Clause, the 
second constitutional f oundation of this hybrid stems f rom a 
substantiv e  due process theory that parents hav e a right to direct their 
children' s  upbringing.35 O ne f orm of this parental right is the "right[] 
of parents to direct the religious upbringing of their children."36 This 
parental right was of course central to Yoder, but its history goes 
f urther back into the golden age of substantiv e  due process, beginning 
with Pierce v. Society of Sisters. 37 Pierce concerned an O regon act that 
mandated that children aged eight through sixteen attend public 
school.38 The Court, relying on a parental right to direct the education 
of their children and send them to priv ate schools if they wish, f ound 
the O regon act unconstitutional.39 Although Pierce did not rely on the 
32. See State v. Miller, 549 N.W.2d 235, 240-41 (Wis. 1996); Att'y Gen. v. Desilets, 636 
N.E.2d 233, 236 (Mass. 1994); Hill-Murray Fed'n of Teachers v. Hill-Murray High Sch., 487 
N.W.2d 857, 865 (Minn. 1992). 
33. The following thirty-five states do not follow a compelling interest test: Alaska, 
Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, 
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, 
Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, 
Ohio, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West 
Virginia, and Wyoming. 
34. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 881 n.l. 
35. The Court has recently confirmed that this right is firmly rooted within the 
Constitution. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (plurality opinion) (describing the 
longstanding history and vitality of the right). Although a splintered plurality opinion, a 
majority of the Court makes it clear that some form - although unclear on the details - of 
a parental rights due process doctrine is going to endure. Id. In fact, eight of the nine justices 
recognized this right, although Justice Thomas questioned its legitimacy. See id at 65; id. at 
77 (Souter, J., concurring); id. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 86-87 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting); id. at 95 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
36. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972) ("However read, the Court's holding in 
Pierce stands as a charter of the rights of parents to direct the religious upbringing of their 
children."). 
37. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
38. Id. at 530. 
39. The court held that: 
[R]ights guaranteed by the Constitution may not be abridged by legislation which has no 
reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the State. The fundamental 
theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any general 
power of the State to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from 
public teachers only. The child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him 
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Free Exercise Clause,40 the Yoder Court specif ically read Pierce as a 
"charter of the rights of parents to direct the religious upbringing of 
their children. " 41 Smith did not attempt to ov errule Pierce or Yoder; in 
f act, one of the two specif ic hybrid rights the Court noted was one 
concerning parental rights acting in conjunction with the Free Exercise 
Clause.42 
D espite Smith's implications, lower courts hav e  f ailed to 
univ ersally embrace hybrid rights, and the courts that hav e  accepted 
the idea hav e  struggled to set f orth a consistent understanding of when 
and how the constitutional right should apply.43 The circuit courts hav e  
off ered three v ery diff erent general schools of thought on how to 
address a hybrid claim.44 Some circuits do not accept hybrid rights at 
all. Ev en in those circuits that do accept hybrid rights, two distinct 
modes of analysis hav e  dev eloped. As a result, claimants, attorneys, 
and judges all appear deeply conf used about how exactly to f rame a 
f ree exercise hybrid rights challenge. Complicating matters, the 
Supreme Court has off ered no f urther guidance on who is right or 
wrong. 
This N ote argues that parents hav e  a f undamental right under the 
U .S. Constitution to direct the religious upbringing of their children 
and that courts interpreting Smith hav e  systematically misunderstood 
and misapplied the Supreme Court's conf using hybrid rights language. 
Part I explains how Yoder and Smith create and preserv e  parents' 
right to direct the religious upbringing of their children. The essential 
point is that the f ree exercise right and the parental right are not 
examined independently and simply added together, but instead are 
incorporated together to prov ide a specif ic bite to the f ree exercise 
claim. Part I also examines the lower courts' treatment of hybrid rights 
and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare 
him for additional obligations. 
Id. at 535. 
40. The claimants did stress the statute's negative impact on parochial schools and 
religious liberty, but the Court probably ignored the free exercise nature of these claims 
because the Clause's restrictions had not yet been placed upon state governments. See 
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (holding for the first time that the free exercise 
clause applies to the states). 
41. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233. 
42. Employment Div. Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882 (1990). 
43. See Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 165 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(reviewing hybrid rights jurisprudence), rev'd en bane, 220 F.3d 1134 (2000). 
44. The first school dismisses the hybrid language as mere dicta. See Leebaert v. 
Harrington, 332 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2003). The second school requires an independently viable 
claim in conjunction with the free exercise claim. See Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prod., Inc., 
68 F.3d 525 (1st Cir. 1995). The third school requires a colorable claim in conjunction with 
the free exercise claim. See Swanson v. Gutherie lndep. Sch. Dist., 135 F.3d 694 (10th Cir. 
1998). 
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claims and argue s that no lowe r  court has corre ctly articulate d  the 
hybrid ri ghts standard be cause the y have looke d  sole ly at the language 
on its face wi thout sufficie ntly e xami ning the purpose and history of 
the right. P art II de lve s  dee pe r  into the Supre me Court's Free 
Exe rci se Clause jurisprude nce and argue s that pare ntal free e xe rci se 
challe nge s to public school policie s must be analyze d unde r pre -Smith 
scruti ny. For e xample ,  the hybrid rights language re quire s that pare nts 
have a fundame ntal right to dire ct the re ligious upbringing of thei r 
childre n  as e xe mplifie d by Yoder. P art II furthe r e xplains why pare ntal 
free e xe rci se claims must be tre ate d se riously and propose s  a solution 
in how the scope of this right should be applie d  by de tailing the prope r  
scrutiny that courts must use . 
I. WHY LOWER COURTS FAIL TO UNDERSTAND THE 
MEANING OF YODER & SMITH 
Fundame ntal to Free Exe rci se Clause juri sprude nce i s  the Court's 
asse rtion i n  Smith that " [t]he only de cisi ons in which we have he ld that 
the Fi rst Ame ndme nt bars appli cati on of a ne utral, ge ne rally 
applicable law to re ligi ously motivate d acti on have i nvolve d  not the 
Free Exe rci se Clause alone , but the Free Exe rcise Clause in 
conjunction with othe r consti tuti onal prote ctions. "45 This part 
addre sse s the implicati ons of thi s  argume nt and e xplains how lowe r 
courts have mi sinte rpre te d the language . Se ction I.A argue s that Smith 
di d not e xtinguish the pare ntal right to dire ct the re ligi ous upbringi ng 
of one 's child. It note s  the hybrid the ory implicit in Yoder's rationale 
and de tails the spe ci al signifi cance of pare ntal free e xe rci se rights i n  
e ducati on. Se ction I.B shows that circuit courts that have conclude d  
that hybrid ri ghts do not e xist are ignoring Supre me Court pre ce de nt 
and mi sconstrui ng the law. Se cti on l .C e xamine s ci rcui t court de cisions 
that have re cognize d hybrid ri ghts only whe n the re is an 
inde pe nde ntly vi able claim and conclude s that the se circui ts 
misunde rstand the point of hybrid ri ghts. In such case s  an 
inde pe nde ntly viable claim should by de fi nition be able to carry the 
day on its own - inde pe nde ntly. Finally, Se cti on l .D e xamine s the 
circuit courts that have re cogni ze d hybrid rights, but only re qui re a 
45. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881. For support of this statement, the Court cited Wisconsin v. 
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944) (invalidating 
a tax on solicitation as applied to the dissemination of religious ideas on free exercise and 
power of the press grounds); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (same); and 
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (invalidating a licensing system for religious and 
charitable solicitations because the law abridged the free exercise of religion and the 
freedom to communicate). The court also cited a number of cases decided on freedom of 
speech and association grounds that also involved the free exercise of religion. See Roberts 
v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); 
West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
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colorable claim as opposed to an independently viable claim. These 
courts have made a valiant effort but ultimately have misconstrued the 
standard and therefore are equally ineffective at determining when an 
exception to a generally applicable law is mandated. 
A. The Right of Parents to Direct the Religious 
Upbringing of Their Children 
The Smith Court, primarily because of two different policy 
concerns, rejected the previously held idea that the Constitution 
mandates certain religious exemptions from generally applicable 
laws. 46 The fi rst concern was that if someone is entitled to evade 
general laws merely because of religious convictions, that person 
effectively becomes a "law unto himself. "47 The second concern 
stemmed from the Court's fear that federal judges would be unable to 
properly balance the importance of general laws against the 
importance of an individual's religious convictions.48 
The Court has long worried that too liberal an exemption policy 
for free exercise challenges would eviscerate the rule of law and 
proper enforcement. 49 The Court's concern boils down to a fear that in 
a pluralistic U nited States, full of so many religions and faiths, a 
sweeping exemption standard would grant virtually every individual a 
constitutional right to ignore the law. Smith proclaimed that "such a 
system would be courting anarchy" and the danger of anarchy 
"increases in direct proportion to the society's diversity of religious 
beliefs, and its determination to coerce or suppress none of them. "50 
Working alongside this trepidation was the Court's concern that 
judges are not equipped to suffi ciently balance the rule of general laws 
with an individual's religious convictions. Combining the "horrible" 
contemplation that federal judges must engage in balancing with the 
possibility of "anarchy" if each man is a "law unto himself," the Smith 
Court proclaimed that it is the legislative process, not the courts, 
which must safeguard the fr ee exercise of religion: 51 
46. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 889-90. 
47. Id. at 879. 
48. See id. at 889-90 n. 5 ("It is a parade of horribles because it is horrible to 
contemplate that federal judges will regularly balance against the importance of general laws 
the significance of religious practice."). 
49. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1879) ("Can a man excuse 
his practices to the contrary [of law] because of his religious belief? To permit this would be 
to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in 
effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.") (holding that religious practice 
was not a defense to polygamy laws). 
50. Smith, 494 U.S. at 888. 
51. In retrospect, it is clear that the Court meant specific state exemption clauses and 
not sweeping, national legislative language. This is apparent because the Court subsequently 
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It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the political process 
will place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not 
widely engaged in; but that unavoidable consequence of democratic 
government must be preferred to a system in which each conscience is a 
law unto itself or in which judges weigh the social importance of all laws 
against the centrality of all religious beliefs.s2 
The me ri ts of the Court' s  argume nts have bee n sufficie ntly 
addre sse d e lse whe re .s3 The basic c ri ti que s are that c ourts wi ll 
ulti mate ly deci de i f  an e xe mpti on i s  warrante d and the ref ore be able 
to safe guard ge ne ral laws; that balanci ng c onf lic ti ng i nte re sts i s  the 
ve ry thi ng judge s  are suppose d  to do and have always done; and that 
le avi ng e ve rythi ng to the le gi slati ve proce ss wi ll e ffec ti ve ly gut one of 
the F ree Exe rci se Clause' s pri mary purpose s  - to protec t mi nori ty 
fai ths from majori ty oppre ssi on.s4 The purpose of thi s Note , howe ve r, 
i s  not to c ri ti que Smith. Rathe r, i t  i s  to unde rstand the deci si on and 
e xplai n  why the hybri d  ri ght of pare nts to di rec t the re li gi ous 
upbri ngi ng of thei r c hi ldre n  de se rve s  speci al sc ruti ny. 
By di sti ngui shi ng Yoder, Smith c onfi rme d that the Court' s 1972 
deci si on re mai ne d  good law.ss F urthe rmore , the Court made the 
me ans for di sti ngui shi ng Yoder abundantly c le ar-i n  Yoder, the F ree 
Exe rci se Clause was ac ti ng i n  c onjunc ti on wi th the "ri ght of 
pare nts . . .  to di rec t the e duc ati on of thei r c hil dre n,"s6 whi le i n  Smith 
the free e xe rci se c lai m stood alone . The longstandi ng ambi gui ty of the 
deci si on c ome s not from what the Court sai d  i n  Smith, but from what 
the opi ni on di d not say - the Court offe re d  no support for why i t  
should matte r  that the two ri ghts we re ac ti ng "i n c onjunc ti on." Thi s 
see mi ngly i llogic al c onc lusi on c ouple d  wi th a lack of support has bee n  
the re ason that hybri d  ri ghts have recei ve d the i re of lowe r c ourts and 
c omme ntators alike . It i s  true that Smith offe re d no justific ati on for 
hybri d ri ghts, but i t  c annot be automatic ally c onc lude d that hybri d 
ri ghts are i llogic al si mply bec ause of thei r lack of support. Although 
support i s  lacki ng i n  Smith, the logic be hi nd a pare ntal hybri d ri ght c an 
be found e mbe dde d  i n  free e xe rci se pri nci ple s  and the Yoder opi ni on 
i tse lf. 
Chie f J ustice Burge r's opi ni on i n  Yoder i s  c onsi de re d by many to 
be the hi gh wate r mark of free e xe rci se protec ti on.s7 Be fore Smith, 
struck down the RFRA while favorably citing state exceptions to drug laws for religious 
peyote use. Id. at 890. 
52. Id. · 
53. See, e.g. , McConnell, supra note 14, at 1141-50. 
54. Id. 
55. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881. 
56. Id. 
57. See, e.g., Mary Jean Dolan, The Constitutional Flaws in the New Illinois Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act: Why RFRAs Don't Work, 31 LOY. U. Ou L.J. 153, 161 (2000). 
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Yoder was vi ewed as a proc lamati on that even generally applic able 
laws must someti mes gi ve way to i ndi vi dual free exerci se exc epti ons.58 
Smith seems to have devastated that vi ew whi le somehow leavi ng 
Yoder i ntac t.59 In order to understand that anomaly, Yoder must be 
read c arefully to rec ogniz e the subtle i nterplay between parents' free 
exerci se ri ghts and thei r ri ght to di rec t  thei r c hi ldren's educ ati on. 
Fi rst, Yoder was c lear that parental c lai ms to di rec t the educ ati on 
of thei r c hi ldren, absent any reli gi ous groundi ng, would never be 
enough to grant an exc epti on to a general law: "A way of li fe, however 
vi rtuous and admi rable, may not be i nterposed as a barri er to 
reasonable state regulati on of educ ati on i f  i t  i s  based on purely sec ular 
c onsi derati ons; to have the protec ti on of the Reli gi on Clauses, the 
c lai ms must be rooted i n  reli gi ous beli ef."60 F rom language lik e  thi s, 
some assumed that the F ree Exerci se Clause di d all the work i n  
Yoder,61 but suc h  an assumpti on i gnores muc h  of the opi ni on's text. 
Vi ewi ng Yoder si mply as a free exerci se c ase i gnores the Court's 
repeated referenc es to the i mportanc e  of the parental ri ghts at stak e. 
The Court wrote that the c ase i nvolved "the fundamental i nterest of 
parents, as c ontrasted wi th that of the State, to gui de the reli gi ous 
future and educ ati on of thei r c hi ldren."62 F urthermore, " [t] he hi story 
and c ulture of Western ci vi liz ati on reflec t a strong tradi ti on of 
parental c onc ern for the nurture and upbri ngi ng of thei r c hi ldren. Thi s 
pri mary role of the parents i n  the upbri ngi ng of thei r  c hi ldren i s  now 
establi shed beyond debate as an enduri ng Americ an tradi ti on."63 
Fi nally, the Court c harac teriz ed Pierce v. Society of Sisters as "a 
c harter of the ri ghts of parents to di rec t the reli gi ous upbri ngi ng of 
thei r c hi ldren. "64 
Most i mportantly, the Court held that " when the i nterests of 
parenthood are combined wi th a free exerci se c lai m of the nature 
58. See, e.g., Quaring v. Peterson, 728 F.2d 1 121, 1 123 (8th Cir. 1984) ("Before the state 
may refuse to issue [the requested exemption], 'It must appear either that the State does not 
deny the free exercise of religious belief by its requirement, or that there is a state interest of 
sufficient magnitude to override the interest claiming protection under the Free Exercise 
Clause."') (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972)). 
59. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 881 n.l. 
60. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215. The Court then adds that "if the Amish asserted their claims 
because of their subjective evaluation and rejection of the contemporary secular values 
accepted by the majority, much as Thoreau rejected the social values of his time and isolated 
himself at Walden Pond, their claims would not rest on a religious basis." Id. at 216. 
61. See Brian A. Freeman, Trends in First Amendment Jurisprudence: Expiating the Sins 
of Yoder and Smith: Toward a Unified Theory of First Amendment Exemptions from Neutral 
Laws of General Applicability, 66 Mo. L. REV. 9, 54 (2001) ("Certainly the Court in Yoder 
referred to no right other than free exercise."). 
62. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 232. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. at 233. 
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re ve ale d by thi s rec ord, more than me re ly a ' re asonable re lati on to 
some purpose wi thi n  the c ompe te nc y  of the State' i s  re qui re d to 
sustai n the vali di ty of the State 's re qui re me nt under the First 
Amendment."65 It i s  he re that the "hybri d" i mpac t  at work i n  Yoder i s  
most e vi de nt.66 The free e xe rci se c lai m worki ng toge the r wi th the 
pare ntal c lai m de se rve s more than "re asonable re lati on" re vie w.67 
F urthe r possi ble c onfusi on c ome s from tryi ng to deci phe r  what 
ri ght i s  ac tually doi ng the work i n  Yoder. The Court he ld that whe n 
"the i nte re sts of pare nthood are c ombi ne d wi th a free e xe rci se c lai m" 
aki n  to the c lai m i n  Yoder, the re must be more than a re asonable 
re lati onshi p  to a le gi ti mate state purpose i n  orde r  to sati sfy the 
"State 's re qui re me nt under the First Amendment."68 More ove r, the 
Court affi rme d the Wi sc onsi n Supre me Court's deci si on that Y ode r' s 
c onvic ti on was "i nvali d  unde r the F ree Exe rci se Clause of the Fi rst 
Ame ndme nt to the U ni te d  State s Consti tuti on. "69 Thus, Yoder's 
holdi ng falls unde r the Fi rst Ame ndme nt. Yoder re ste d  on the free 
e xe rci se ri ghts of pare nts, not on thei r ri ghts to c ontrol public sc hool 
e duc ati on.70 Re li gi on i s  the nece ssary force unde rlyi ng Yoder. The e nd 
re sult i s  that ce rtai n  free e xe rci se c lai ms are paramount - one of 
whic h i s  the fundame ntal ri ght of pare nts to c ontrol the re li gi ous 
de sti ny of thei r c hi ldre n, e ve n  i n  the face of public e duc ati on. 
Yoder di d not hold that the ri ght to di rec t  the upbri ngi ng of one 's 
c hi ld i s  provi de d  a hi ghe r de gree of protec ti on whe n i t  i s  re li gi ously 
moti vate d, but rathe r, that the free e xe rci se c halle nge i s  provi de d  a 
hi ghe r de gree of protec ti on whe n re li gi on ac ts i n  c onjunc ti on wi th 
pare ntal ri ghts. Our c ountry has tradi ti onally bee n dee ply c once rne d 
wi th i nfri nge me nts on free e xe rci se that di rec tly affec t the ri ght of 
pare nts to de te rmi ne the re li gi ous upbri ngi ng of thei r c hi ldre n.71 The 
Court e xplici tly he ld that the pare ntal ri ght on i ts own i s  not e nough. 
But that doe s  not me an that the free e xe rci se c lai m on i ts own i s  not 
65. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 
(1925)). 
66. It is much easier to make sense of the hybrid metaphor when Yoder's "combined 
with" language is recognized. 
67. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233. 
68. See id. (emphasis added). 
69. Id. at 207. 
70. The court could not have been clearer on this point: "Nothing we hold is intended to 
undermine the general applicability of the State's compulsory school-attendance statutes or 
to limit the power of the State to promulgate reasonable standards that, while not impairing 
the free exercise of religion, provide for continuing agricultural vocational education . . . .  " Id. 
at 236 (emphasis added). 
71. See id. at 231-32 (referencing the Court's previous recognitions of the "traditional 
concepts of parental control over the religious upbringing and education of their minor 
children" and stating that the "primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children 
is now established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition"). 
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e no ugh. The free e xe rci se c lai m may i n  fac t c arry the wei ght o n  i ts 
o wn, but o nly ce rtai n  type s o f  free e xe rci se c lai ms may do so . In 
Yoder, fo r e xample ,  i t  was tho se c lai ms that i nvo lve a pare nt's atte mpt 
to gui de the re li gio us e duc atio n o f  hi s c hi ld. Fo r the se type s o f  c lai ms, 
co urts must use a mo re e xac ti ng leve l  o f  sc ruti ny.72 
Appro ac hi ng the pare ntal hybri d ri ght thi s  way allo ws o ne to give 
mo re c re de nce to Smith's language whi le re alizi ng that the Co urt was 
doi ng mo re than me re ly sugge sti ng that two i nv ali d  co nsti tutio nal 
c laims adde d to ge the r  e qual o ne v ali d c lai m.73 Fo r eve n i f  the primary 
purpo se o f  de sc ri bi ng Yoder as a hybri d right was i n  o rde r to 
di sti ngui sh the c ase ,74 the c harac te riz atio n sti ll re mai ns vi able and 
fai thful to Yoder's speci fic proc lamatio ns. Pe rhaps part o f  the 
co nfusio n i s  that the wo rd " hybri d" o r  the phrase "i n co njunc tio n  
wi th" are no t preci se de sc ri ptio ns o f  the Co urt's thi nki ng. Inste ad o f  
vie wi ng i ndivi dual co nsti tutio nal rights as co mple te ly se t o ff fro m o ne 
ano the r i n  i ndivi dual bo xe s - as the wo rd " hybri d" and the phrase "i n 
co njunc tio n wi th" may sugge st - i t  i s  mo re preci se to thi nk o f  the 
ri ghts as inte rco nnec te d  sphe re s. Thi nki ng o f  a ki nd o f  co nsti tutio nal 
Ve nn di agram allo ws o ne to vi sualize a mo re po we rful Fi rst 
Ame ndme nt free e xe rci se c ase whe n the sphe re i s  i nte rco nnec te d  wi th 
pare ntal ri ghts.75 It appe ars mo re acc urate to c lai m that the F ree 
Exe rci se Clause i nco rpo rate s  pare ntal ri ghts i n  thi s i nstance , as 
o ppo se d  to ac ti ng i n  co njunc tio n  wi th the m.76 Re gardle ss o f  ho w o ne 
c harac te rize s i t, Smith stands as a reco gni tio n that i ndivi dual ri ghts do 
72. This idea is hardly novel in constitutional jurisprudence. For example, there are at 
least three different tiers of scrutiny used under equal protection analysis. Staying within the 
First Amendment context, the Court uses different standards of review for freedom of 
speech claims depending on the circumstances of the infringement. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 
124 S. Ct. 1769, 1786 (2004) (plurality opinion) ("It is elementary that scrutiny levels are 
claim specific. An action that triggers a heightened level of scrutiny for one claim may 
receive a very different level of scrutiny for a different claim because the underlying rights, 
and consequently constitutional harms, are not comparable."). 
73. See Eric A. DeGroff, State Regulation of Nonpublic Schools: Does the Tie Still 
Bind?, 2003 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 363 n. 69 (2003) ("One can question whether the hybrid 
claim exception makes sense, as it appears the Court is engaging in a form of new math, 
suggesting that 0 + 0 = 1."). 
74. See supra note 21. 
75. Cf Mary Ann Glendon & Raul F. Yannes, Structural Free Exercise, 90 MICH. L. 
REV. 477, 548 (1991 ). Glendon and Yannes state: 
Id. 
Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court in Employment Division v. Smith, moreover, reveals a 
majority ready to take account of the interplay among the various parts of the Bill of Rights, 
specifically, the ways in which one constitutional value can be amplified or muted by its 
association with other constitutional values. 
76. By incorporate, I mean that the two rights combine together in order to form a 
united whole. The word "hybrid," on the other hand, connotes some type of unnatural 
pairing resulting in mutation. 
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not e xist in a vac uum, but inste ad inte rplay and work toge the r as we ll 
as against e ac h  othe r.77 
B .  Mere Dicta: Circuit Courts Denying the 
Existence of Hybrid Rights 
Although the Smith Court ref use d to ove rrule Yoder and inste ad 
re lie d on it as an e xample of a c ase in whic h "the F irst Ame ndme nt 
bars applic ation of a ne utral, ge ne rally applic able law to re ligiously 
motivate d  ac tion,"78 two c irc uits have dec ide d to ignore the Court's 
language and de ny the e xiste nce of hybrid rights.79 
In Kissinger v. Board of Trustees,80 the Sixth Circ uit aff irme d the 
distric t c ourt's dismissal of Ms. K issinge r's c laim fo r attorne y's fee s 
unde r 42 U .S.C. § 1988 bec ause the c ourt de te rmine d that The Ohio 
State U nive rsity was not re quire d to alte r its ve te rinary-me dic ine 
c urric ulum in orde r to acc ommodate Ms. K issinge r's re ligious be lief s.81 
The c ourt distinguishe d Yoder by stating that the plaintiff was not 
re quire d  to atte nd Ohio State , while the c hildre n  in Yoder we re 
c halle nging a law that re quire d the ir atte ndance at public sc hool.82 The 
c ourt also re jec te d  Ms. K issinge r's hybrid rights c laim.83 D rawing 
stre ngth f rom a rece nt J ustice Soute r  c onc urre nce c ritic izing the 
hybrid rights e xce ption,84 the c ourt state d  that the ide a that the le gal 
standard unde r the F ree Exe rc ise Clause would c hange de pe nding on 
whe the r the free e xe rc ise c halle nge was c ouple d  with anothe r  
c onstitutional protec tion was "c omple te ly illogic al. "85 F inally, the 
77. See id. ("What Scalia referred to as 'hybrid' cases requiring a higher level of scrutiny 
were those in which the plaintiffs' claims seemed especially strong because they were 
supported by mutually reinforcing constitutional rights"). Cf Boyd v. United States, 116 
U.S. 616, 633 (1886) (noting "the intimate relation between the [Fourth and Fifth] 
amendments"). 
78. Employment Div. Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990). 
79. See Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F.3d 134, 144 (2d Cir. 2003); Kissinger v. Bd. of 
Trustees, 5 F.3d 177, 180-81 (6th Cir. 1993). 
80. 5 F.3d 177 (6th Cir. 1993). 
81. Id. at 178. 
82. Id. at 180-81. It seems that the case could have been distinguished on simpler 
grounds, namely, that Kissinger was not a parent objecting to a law which interfered with the 
rights of a parent to direct the religious upbringing of her child during the child's formative 
years. 
83. In addition to her free exercise claim, Ms. Kissinger also made section 1983 claims 
based on her freedom of speech, association, and her rights to due process and equal 
protection. Id. at 179. 
84. See infra note 135 and accompanying text. 
85. Kissinger, 5 F.3d at 180. The court also confessed that it could not "see how a state 
regulation would violate the Free Exercise Clause if it implicates other constitutional rights 
but would not violate the free Exercise Clause if it did not implicate other constitutional 
rights." Id. 
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c ourt c onc lude d that "until the Supre me Court holds that le gal 
standards unde r  the F ree Exe rc ise Clause vary de pe nding on whe the r  
othe r c onstitutional rights are implic ate d, we will not use a stric te r 
le gal standard than that use d in Smith to e valuate ge ne rally applic able , 
e xce ptionle ss state re gulations unde r the F ree Exe rc ise Clause."86 
The Sec ond Circ uit f ollowe d the Sixth Circ uit' s le ad. In Leebaert v. 
Harrington,87 the c ourt he ld that a f athe r's right to direc t the e duc ation 
of his c hild did not re quire his son's sc hool to e xe mpt him f rom a 
mandatory he alth c lass.88 The c ourt f ound that the re was no 
"f undame ntal right of e ve ry pare nt to te ll a public sc hool what his or 
he r c hild will and will not be taught,"89 that his c laim was not gove rne d 
by Yoder,90 and that a hybrid right did not e xist. The c ourt adopte d  the 
language of Kissinger and agree d that the re was "no good re ason f or 
the standard of re vie w [in f ree e xe rc ise c ase s] to vary simply with the 
numbe r of c onstitutional rights that the plaintiff asse rts have bee n  
violate d."91 Like the Kissinger c ourt, the Sec ond Circ uit did not tre at 
Yoder as an e xample of a hybrid c laim, but inste ad as a diffe re nt 
me ans in whic h  the plaintiff was c halle nging the ge ne rally applic able 
law.92 By distinguishing Yoder on its f ac ts and the n addre ssing the 
hybrid c laim, the c ourt f aile d  to re alize that Yoder is the hybrid rights 
situation. 
The diff ic ulty with both c ourts' re asoning c an be st be summe d up 
with this que stion: If the re is no suc h thing as a hybrid right, and if the 
F ree Exe rc ise Clause ne ve r re lie ve s individuals of the obligation to 
c omply with ne utral laws that inc ide ntally prosc ribe c onduc t  
mandate d  by the individual' s re ligion or re quire c onduc t that is 
prohibite d, how c an one possibly e xplain the Court' s  re asoning in 
Yoder? The answe r is that one c annot; the Sec ond and Sixth Circ uits 
simply ignore d this que stion.93 Eve n if the se c ourts acce pte d  the 
86. Id. 
87. 332 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2003). 
88. Id. at 142. It is important to note that the Connecticut class had an opt-out provision 
which entitled a parent to excuse their child for the six classes dealing with family life 
instruction and AIDS education. Id. at 137. 
89. Id. at 141. 
90. Id. at 144. The court concluded that the class did not threaten Mr. Leebaert's "entire 
way of life" as the law in Yoder did, and therefore Yoder did not apply. Id. 
91. Id. The court further noted that "Smith's 'language relating to hybrid claims is dicta 
and not binding on this court."' Id. at 143 (quoting Knight v. Conn. Dep't of Pub. Health, 
275 F.3d 156, 167 (2d Cir. 2001)). 
92. Id. 
93. The Ninth Circuit has accused the Sixth Circuit of taking "the path of least 
resistance" in Kissinger by throwing "up its hands up in despair" in the face of Smith's hybrid 
language. Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 165 F.3d 692, 704 (9th Cir. 1999), 
rev'd en bane, 220 F.3d 1 134 (2000). 
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re asoning offe re d by many that the only purpose of J ustice Sc alia' s  
hybrid rights e xce ption was to distinguish Yoder,94 it is imprope r fo r 
lowe r  c ourts to simply dismiss Supre me Court language as unbinding 
bec ause the y be lie ve the y  are able to dec iphe r a dee pe r  motive within 
the language that disqual ifie s the language itse lf.95 
Courts that dismisse d Smith's hybrid language while rec ogniz ing 
Yoder as good law gave no indic ation or re asoning for why Yoder 
would still re quire stric te r  sc rutiny.96 The c ourts simply rec ognize d that 
Yoder did rece ive stric te r  sc rutiny and the n state d  that the hybrid 
language was dic ta without offe ring an alte rnative the ory.97 As 
inc omple te as Smith's language may be , it at le ast atte mpte d  to justify 
Yoder whe n it distinguishe d  the c ase .98 If a lowe r c ourt wishe s to stamp 
the hybrid language as dic ta in a c ase analogous to Yoder, it must offe r 
a diffe re nt re ason why Yoder itse lf rece ive d  highe r sc rutiny, since the 
c ase re mains good law. Implying that the Supre me Court is mak ing 
disinge nuous e fforts not to ove rrule its own prece de nt is not good 
e nough. 
F urthe rmore ,  the re is in fac t more to J ustice Sc alia' s  hybrid 
language than a simple me ans to distinguish Yoder.99 F irst, Yoder's 
94. See Joanne C. Brant, Taking the Supreme Court at Its Word: The Implications for 
RFRA and Separation of Powers, 56 MONT. L. REV. 5, 30 (1995) (stating that the exception 
is "an unartful tool to distinguish troubling precedent"); Alan Brownstein, Protecting 
Religious Liberty: The False Messiahs of Free Speech Doctrine and Formal Neutrality, 18 J.L. 
& POL. 119, 187 (2002) (stating that the Smith court's hybrid exception served the specific 
function of allowing the Court to avoid overruling Yoder); McConnell, supra note 14, at 1121 
("One suspects that the notion of 'hybrid' claims was created for the sole purpose of 
distinguishing Yoder in this case."). Other commentators have attacked the existence of 
hybrid rights on more fundamental grounds akin to the Kissinger and Leebaert courts. Some 
echo Justice Souter's belief that the exception could swallow the rule. See Douglas Laycock 
& Oliver S. Thomas, Interpreting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 73 TEX. L. REV. 
209, 214 (1994) ("The hybrid rights exception, which purported to protect free exercise in 
association with some other constitutional right (such as speech or association), has been 
rejected precisely because it had the potential to swallow the rule."). Others have concluded 
that the doctrine merely mandates that one add unsuccessful constitutional claims on top of 
each other and therefore the doctrine is completely illogical. See DeGroff, supra note 73, at 
363 n. 69 ("One can question whether the hybrid claim exception makes sense, as it appears 
the Court is engaging in a form of new math, suggesting that 0 + 0 = 1."); Eric J. Neal, The 
Ninth Circuit's "Hybrid Rights" Error: Three Losers Do Not Make a Winner in Thomas v. 
Anchorage Equal Rights Commission, 24 SEA:TILE UNIV. L. REV. 169 (2000) (stating that 
three insufficient challenges cannot add up to a sufficient one, and also somewhat quizzically 
suggesting that if a court undertakes its analysis properly, a hybrid rights exception cannot 
be found in Smith). 
95. Thomas, 165 F.3d at 705 (stating that it was not the Ninth Circuit's place to 
"speculate or hypothesize about the Justices' true intentions"). 
96. See, e.g., Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F.3d 134, 144 (2d Cir. 2003); Kissinger v. Bd. of 
Trustees, 5 F.3d 177, 180-81 (6th Cir. 1993). 
97. See Leebaert, 332 F.3d at 144; Kissinger, 5 F.3d at 180-81. 
98. Employment Div. Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990). 
99. Professor McConnell, on the other hand, believes that if the Court was truly sincere 
about hybrid rights, they would have recognized one using the facts of Smith itself. See 
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proc lamation that highe r sc rutiny was nee de d  whe n " the inte re sts of 
pare nthood are c ombine d with a free e xe rc ise c laim"100 c lose ly mirrors 
Smith's " in c onjunc tion with" language . This ce rtainly we ake ns c laims 
that Justice Sc alia plucke d hybrid rights out of thin air.101 Sec ond, in 
disse nt, Justice Sc alia had shortly be fore Smith c ite d the Court' s  
rec ognition that "in some c irc umstance s State s  must acc ommodate the 
be lie fs of re ligious c itize ns by e xe mpting the m from ge ne rally 
applic able re gulations."102 This language sugge sts that Justice Sc alia 
was think ing approvingly of re ligious e xce ptions to ge ne rally 
applic able state laws be fore he e ve r  wrote the Smith opinion.103 Third, 
the Court had a c hance to re fine its language or disc ard it in City of 
Boerne v. Flores.104 Inste ad, Justice Ke nne dy' s  opinion re affirme d 
Smith's holding and once again offe re d Yoder as a distinguishable c ase 
bec ause " [t] hat c ase implic ate d not only the right to the free e xe rc ise 
of re ligion but also the right of pare nts to c ontrol the ir c hildre n' s  
e duc ation. "105 
It is ce rtainly possible to c lassify the Court' s  hybrid language as 
dic ta, although it is que stionable that Justice Sc alia would.106 But 
bec ause the Court re lie d on Yoder in its dec ision, 107 the rationale of 
the c ase must be de alt with se riously whe n a c laimant use s it as 
support. Smith offe re d  one way to de al with Yoder - hybrid rights. If 
a lowe r  c ourt c onside rs that me thod dic ta and re jec ts it as suc h, the 
c ourt the n has a duty to offe r an alte rnative le gal the ory upon whic h 
future c laimants may re ly, bec ause the law still holds that Yoder se rve s 
as an e xample of an e xce ption to the ge ne ral rule . 
McConnell, supra note 14, at 1122. This claim is open to debate. Although this Note will not 
engage in an extensive digression into free speech doctrine, it is questionable whether or not 
the religious purpose of smoking peyote represents any type of protected communicative 
activity. 
100. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233. 
101. See supra note 94. 
102. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 617 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
103. Edwards was decided in 1987, three years before Smith. 
104. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
105. Id. at 513-14. 
106. Although the language was not central to the Court's holding, it is arguable that the 
language was central to the Court's reasoning in Smith. See Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 
451, 469 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority's attempt to offer a "concept 
of dictum that includes the very reasoning of the opinion"). Furthermore, lower courts have 
recognized that they should "consider and respect Supreme Court dicta as well as holdings 
because the Supreme Court hears relatively few cases and frequently uses dicta to give 
guidance to the lower courts." Town Sound and Custom Tops v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 959 
F.2d 468, 496 n.41 (3d Cir. 1992) (en bane). 
107. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 881. 
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C. Independently Viable Claims: Circuit Courts Recognizing Hybrid 
Rights While Eviscerating Their Power 
Only the Sec ond and Sixth Circ uits have gone so far as to proc laim 
that a hybrid right c an ne ve r e xist.108 But othe r c ourts that have 
rec ognize d hybrid rights none the le ss have struggle d to imple me nt a 
c ohe re nt standard.109 The struggle is appare nt whe n one e xamine s the 
ide a of an inde pe nde ntly viable c laim re quire me nt use d by the F irst 
Circ uit110 and once by the D .C. Circ uit.11 1  Inste ad of dismissing Smith's 
hybrid language as dic ta, the se Circ uits re quire that in orde r  to rece ive 
stric te r sc rutiny, c laimants must offe r an inde pe nde ntly viable c laim in 
addition to the ir free e xe rc ise c laim.112 
In Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Products, Inc. , two high sc hool 
stude nts and the ir pare nts sue d  the direc tors of an AID S aware ne ss 
program and the sc hool c ommittee for what the y c onside re d an 
offe nsive mandatory asse mbly.113 The plaintiffs file d a se xually hostile 
e nvironme nt c laim and also c laime d that the asse mbly de prive d the 
c hildre n  of the ir privac y  rights, substantive due proce ss rights, 
proce dural due proce ss rights, and the ir free e xe rc ise right in 
c onjunc tion with a pare ntal right to direc t the upbringing of the ir 
c hildre n.114 The F irst Circ uit found all the se c laims to be without 
me rit.115 
108. See Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2003); Kissinger v. Bd. of 
Trustees, 5 F.3d 177 (6th Cir. 1993). 
109. See e.g. , Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prod., Inc., 68 F.3d 525 (1st Cir. 1995). 
110. Id. at 539. 
1 1 1 .  EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 467 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
1 12. See Brown, 68 F.3d at 539. 
1 13. Id. at 529. The complaint alleged that the director of the assembly: 
1) told the students that they were going to have a "group sexual experience, with audience 
participation"; 2) used profane, lewd, and lascivious language to describe body parts and 
excretory functions; 3) advocated and approved oral sex, masturbation, homosexual sexual 
activity, and condom use during promiscuous premarital sex; 4) simulated masturbation; 5) 
characterized the loose pants worn by one minor as "erection wear"; 6) referred to being in 
"deep sh(it]" after anal sex; 7) had a male minor lick an oversized condom with her, after 
which she had a female minor pull it over the male minor's entire head and blow it up; 8) 
encouraged a male minor to display his "orgasm face" with her for the camera; 9) informed a 
male minor that he was not having enough orgasms; 10) closely inspected a minor and told 
him he had a "nice butt"; and 11) made eighteen references to orgasms, six references to 
male genitals, and eight references to female genitals. 
Id. at 529. 
1 14. Id. at 530. 
115. Id. at 541. Although the RFRA was in force during the appeal, the court found that 
it did not apply retroactively and therefore it should not be applied to the assembly, which 
took place before the RFRA's enactment. Id. at 537-38. 
August 2005] The Free Exercise of Religion 2227 
With re spec t to the hybrid c laim, the c ourt first addre sse d the 
pare ntal right to direc t the upbringing of the ir c hildre n,116 but also 
que stione d  whe the r  the pare ntal right was fundame ntal117 - a 
que stion that is now se ttle d in the affirmative . 118 The F irst Circ uit the n  
c orrec tly c onc lude d that standing by itse lf, the pare ntal right found in 
Pierce and Meyer v. Nebraska119 was not broad e nough to force public 
sc hools to ame nd the ir c urric ulum for e ve ry c hild whose pare nts have 
"ge nuine moral disagree me nts with [a] sc hool' s  c hoice of subjec t 
matte r."120 The Meyer Court had rec ognize d pare ntal due proce ss 
rights in holding unc onstitutional a Ne braska statute that prohibite d  
public sc hools from te ac hing in any language othe r than English.121 
The diffe re nce be twee n Meyer and Brown, the F irst Circ uit note d, is 
that the first c ase "involve [ d] the state prosc ribing pare nts from 
e duc ating the ir c hildre n, while the sec ond involve d  pare nts pre sc ribing 
what the state shall te ac h the ir c hildre n."122 
The c ourt the n  c onside re d the free e xe rc ise hybrid c laim. 
Esse ntially, the F irst Circ uit split this c laim into two distinc t  te sts: 
(1) is the free e xe rc ise c halle nge c onjoine d with an "inde pe nde ntly 
protec te d  c onstitutional protec tion";123 or (2) doe s  the c laim fall within 
the "swee p of Yoder"?124 The c ourt made a swift de te rmination that 
the pare nts faile d the first te st bec ause the ir pare ntal rights c laim 
faile d and the re fore the y did not make out an inde pe nde ntly viable 
c laim.125 The c ourt state d that the pare nts' c laim also faile d the sec ond 
te st bec ause the y faile d to show a thre at to the ir "e ntire way of life " 
116. Id. at 533. The parents addressed this issue by claiming that the "defendants 
violated their privacy right to direct the upbringing of their children and educate them in 
accord with their own views." Id. at 532. It seems odd to characterize this right as one of 
privacy as opposed to being found more generally in the Due Process Clause's "liberty" 
language. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000). 
117. Id. at 533. The court also stated that the parental rights foundational cases would 
likely be decided today on First Amendment grounds because the Amendment has since 
been incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 533 n.5. 
118. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 57. 
119. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). For a discussion of Pierce, see supra notes 37-41 and 
accompanying text. 
120. Brown, 68 F.3d at 534. 
121. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 403. 
122. Brown, 68 F.3d at 534. 
123. Id. at 539. 
124. Id. The court's discussion of this issue was confined to the parents' claims for 
monetary damages. The court also found that the claimants lacked the standing required for 
declaratory relief. Id. 
125. Id. The court did not state any reason for why this was the proper test to use nor 
did the court discuss the origins of the test. 
2228 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 103:2209 
and the ir situation was the re fore " qualitative ly distinguishable " from 
Yoder.126 
Le ss than a ye ar late r, the D .C. Circ uit dec ide d EEOC v. Catholic 
University of America. 127 The c ase mate rialize d afte r Catholic 
U nive rsity de nie d te nure to a D ominic an nun who subse que ntly file d 
a Title V II c laim against the U nive rsity.128 In a c omple x  opinion, the 
c ourt he ld that it was barre d  from rev ie wing the e mployme nt dec ision 
bec ause of the ministe rial e xce ption to the Free Exe rc ise Clause 129 and 
bec ause to do so would have c onstitute d e xce ssive e ntangle me nt 
be twee n c hurc h and state unde r the Establishme nt Clause .13° But the 
c ourt also state d  that eve n if the ministe rial e xce ption did not survive 
Smith, a "hybrid right" would be rec ognize d bec ause the c ourt found 
the e xce ssive e ntangle me nt c laim inde pe nde ntly viable .131 Although 
the c ourt did not ide ntify this te st as the " inde pe nde ntly v iable "  
approac h, the approac h is substantially the same as the one adopte d  
by the First Circ uit.132 
The inde pe nde ntly viable approac h  to hybrid rights c laims pre se nts 
many of the same proble ms that are inhe re nt in the Sixth and Sec ond 
Circ uits' approac h  of simply de nying the right's e xiste nce .133 Although 
c ourts that follow the inde pe nde ntly v iable approac h  are mak ing a 
good faith atte mpt to adhe re to Smith, the approac h  will typic ally le ad 
to the ev isce ration of all hybrid rights. If the inde pe nde ntly viable 
c laim on its own c an raise the leve l  of sc rutiny, the re is no nee d  to 
126. Id. ("Here, the plaintiffs do not allege that the one-time compulsory attendance at 
the Program threatened their entire way of life. Accordingly, the plaintiffs' free exercise 
claim for damages was properly dismissed."). 
127. 83 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
128. Id. at 459-60. 
129. Id. at 461. Essentially, the ministerial exception precludes courts "from 
adjudicating employment discrimination suits by ministers against the church or religious 
institution employing them." Id. 
130. Id. at 466. 
131. See id. at 467 ("As a consequence, this case presents the kind of "hybrid situation" 
referred to in Smith that permits us to find a violation of the Free Exercise Clause even if 
our earlier conclusion that the ministerial exception survived Smith should prove 
mistaken."). Although outside of the sphere of parental rights, the Catholic University 
decision merits discussion because it is one of the few cases in which the court actually 
recognized the existence of a hybrid right. The existence of the right in this case was entirely 
peripheral, however, because the court had already decided the question using the 
ministerial exception. Furthermore, free exercise challenges in conjunction with 
Establishment Clause challenges were not among the challenges that Smith sought to 
distinguish. 
132. See Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 220 F.3d 1134, 1 148 (9th Cir. 
2000) (stating that both Brown and Catholic University stand for the proposition that "a free 
exercise claim based on the hybrid rights exception must include at least a colorable claim of 
infringement of a companion right"). 
133. See supra notes 96-105 and accompanying text. 
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invoke the Free Exe rc ise Clause at all, le t alone in c onjunc tion with 
the inde pe nde nt right.134 This point is be st summe d up in Justice 
Soute r's Church of Lukumi Babalu v. City of Hialeah c onc urre nce: 
But if a hybrid claim is one in which a litigant would actually obtain an 
exemption from a formally neutral, generally applicable law under 
another constitutional provision, then there would have been no reason 
for the Court in what Smith calls the hybrid cases to have mentioned the 
Free Exercise Clause at all.135 
To illustrate Justice Soute r' s  point, c onside r  a diffe re nt 
hypothe tic al re sult in Brown: The First Circ uit inste ad initially 
c onc lude s  that the pare nts' substantive due proce ss right to direc t the 
upbringing of the ir c hildre n  automatic ally trigge rs he ighte ne d sc rutiny 
whe ne ve r  pare nts objec t to a public sc hool' s  c urric ulum.136 The sc hool 
would the n be force d to provide its re asons for the c urric ulum c hoice 
and also show that the c urric ulum was suffic ie ntly tailore d  to advance 
those re asons. But it would be unnece ssary for suc h a ruling to e ve n  
c onside r  the free e xe rc ise c halle nge . If one agree s with this re asoning, 
the n the ac tual re asoning of Brown also make s pe rfec t se nse: bec ause 
the pare nts faile d to state a viable substantive due proce ss right to 
direc t the upbringing of the ir c hildre n, the Free Exe rc ise Clause c an 
add nothing to the ir c laim.137 So unde r  e ithe r approac h, the Free 
Exe rc ise Clause se rve s no purpose and the hybrid rights e xce ption is 
e ntire ly illusory.138 
D .  Colorable Claims: Circuit Courts Searching for Meaningful 
Hybrid Rights Ground 
In an atte mpt to add more c larity and substance to Smith's hybrid 
rights language , the Te nth139 and Ninth140 Circ uits adopte d  a third 
approac h  to e xamining free e xe rc ise c laims made in c onjunc tion with 
134. See Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d at 467. 
135. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 567 (1993) 
(Souter, J., concurring). 
136. This, of course, would be an absurd misreading of precedent since the Court has 
never suggested that schools have to justify their curriculum in response to every parental 
objection. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text. 
137. Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prod., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 539 (1st Cir. 1995). 
138. See Anthony Merlino, Tightening the Seal: Protecting the Catholic Confessional 
from Unprotected Priest-Penitent Privileges, 32 SETON HALL L. REV. 655, 689 (2002) (writing 
that the independently viable claim approach makes the free exercise claim "mere 
surplusage"). 
139. See Swanson v. Gutherie Indep. Sch. Dist., 135 F.3d 694 (10th Cir. 1998). It is 
notable that the plaintiff's case was argued by Professor Laycock, a prominent Free Exercise 
Clause scholar. See Laycock, supra note 94. 
140. See Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 165 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1999), 
rev'd en bane, 220 F.3d 1134 (2000). 
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ano the r  co nsti tutio nal ri ght. Thi s appro ac h  re qui re s so me thi ng le ss 
than an i nde pe nde ntly vi able c lai m: a co lo rable c lai m.141 Agai n, thi s 
appro ac h  sho ws the di ffic ulty i n  i nte rpre ti ng and i mple me nti ng a 
co he re nt hybri d ri ghts standard.142 
In Swanson v. Gutherie Independent School District,143 Annie 
Swanso n and he r pare nts sue d  the Guthe rie Sc hoo l Di stric t i n  an 
atte mpt to fo rce the sc hoo l to le t he r atte nd part-ti me i n  o rde r to 
supple me nt he r ho me sc hoo li ng.144 Annie fi le d a free e xe rci se c lai m 
agai nst the sc hoo l bo ard and he r pare nts fi le d a c lai m agai nst the 
sc hoo l  bo ard fo r de nyi ng the m the ri ght to di rec t  the upbri ngi ng o f  
thei r c hi ld.145 The Te nth Ci rc ui t he ld that the sc hoo l's po lic y  was vali d  
and that Annie was no t e nti tle d  to an e xe mptio n.146 
The co urt fi rst addre sse d the Swanso ns' c lai m that the po lic y  
vio late d  Annie 's free e xe rci se o f  re li gio n  bec ause the po lic y  was no t 
ge ne rally applic able . Afte r di smi ssi ng Annie 's free e xe rci se c lai m o n  
proce dural gro unds,147 the co urt the n addre sse d the pare nts' hybri d  
c lai m by se arc hi ng fo r "ge nui ne " i nfri nge me nts.148 The co urt 
reco gnize d that pare nts have a li mi te d  ri ght to di rec t  thei r c hi ldre n's 
e duc atio n, but that the ri ght was no t so bro ad as to e nable pare nts to 
"co ntro l  e ac h  and e ve ry aspec t o f  thei r c hi ldre n's e duc atio n and o ust 
the state 's autho ri ty o ve r  that subjec t."149 Fi nally, the co urt fo und that 
bec ause the pare nts had no valid ri ght to se nd thei r c hi ld to sc hoo l 
141. See, e.g., Swanson, 135 F.3d at 700. One court has also described the colorable 
claim approach as requiring a "genuine claim of infringement." Hicks v. Halifax County Bd. 
of Educ., 93 F. Supp 2d 649, 662 (E.D.N.C. 1999). 
142. See, e.g. , Swanson, 135 F.3d at 700 ("We note that this case illustrates the difficulty 
of applying the Smith exception."). 
143. 135 F.3d 694 (10th Cir. 1998). 
144. Id. at 696. The School had allowed Annie to attend part-time as a seventh grader 
but a new superintendent was hired after that year and refused to allow her to resume her 
part-time studies as an eighth grader. Id. The reason for the policy change was concern over 
the fact that the state did not count part-time students when making funding decisions. Id. 
145. Id. 
146. Id. at 703. 
147. Id. at 698. The court quickly dismissed Annie's claim that the policy was aimed 
directly at Annie in an attempt to discriminate against Christian home-schoolers because the 
discriminatory aspect of the claim was not raised below at the district court level. Although 
one cannot be sure why the Swansons failed to make this argument at the trial level, it was 
likely because City of Boerne was decided in between the trial and the appeal. Since they 
could have received higher scrutiny under the RFRA, there was presumably no need to 
make the discrimination argument. Regardless, the Tenth Circuit insinuated that even if it 
were to address the claim, it would have found that the policy did not discriminate on the 
basis of religion, but instead on the basis of funding. See id. at 698 n.3. 
148. Id. at 699 ("We must examine the claimed infringements on the party's claimed 
rights to determine whether either the claimed rights or the claimed infringements are 
genuine."). 
149. Id. 
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part-time or to pick the ir c hild' s  c lasse s, the y faile d to make a 
c olorable pare ntal rights c lai m, and the re fore , the c ase di d not pre se nt 
a hybrid ri ghts si tuati on.1so 
In 1999, the Ninth Circ uit also e nte re d the fray.1s1 The Ni nth 
Circ uit's original opinion in Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights 
Commission,1s2 whic h  was late r  withdrawn and re ve rse d on othe r 
grounds,1s3 is signific ant for two distinc t re asons. Fi rst, the c ourt 
offe re d  a thorough re vie w of hybrid ri ghts tre atme nt within the othe r 
c irc ui ts.1s4 Sec ond, the c ase was fundame ntally di ffe re nt from most of 
the typic al hybrid rights c omplaints this Note has e xamine d thus far in 
that i t  did not i nvolve a free e xe rci se c laim in c onjunc tion with a 
pare ntal right or free speec h, but inste ad a free e xe rc ise c laim in 
c onjunc tion with a pe r se tak ings c laim.1ss 
Thomas I i nvolve d  two Alask an landlords who re fuse d to re nt to 
unmarrie d c ouple s  bec ause the y argue d that doi ng so would fac ilitate 
a si n and run afoul of thei r re ligi ous c onvic ti ons.1s6 But by 
disc ri minating against unmarrie d c ouple s, the y would be violating 
both Anc horage and Alask a' s fair housing laws.1s7 So, the landlords 
fi le d suit seek ing a dec laratory judgme nt on the grounds that 
e nforce me nt of the statute against the m  would vi olate the ir free 
e xe rc ise of re ligion.1ss 
Be fore the Ninth Circ uit state d  what standard it would apply to the 
hybrid c laim, it surve ye d  the alte rnative me thods of othe r  c ourts and 
1 50. The court reasoned that 
The claimed constitutional right Plaintiffs wish to establish in this case is the right of parents 
to send their children to public school on a part-time basis, and to pick and choose which 
courses their children will take from the public school. . . .  However, decisions as to how to 
allocate scarce resources, as well as what curriculum to offer or require, are uniquely 
committed to the discretion of local school authorities, as the cases cited above 
demonstrate . . . .  The above discussion establishes that Plaintiffs have shown no colorable 
claim of infringement on the constitutional right to direct a child's education. 
Id. at 699-700. 
151. The First, Sixth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits had already decided hybrid rights issues. 
152. Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 165 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1999) 
[hereinafter Thomas I]. 
153. See Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 220 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2000). 
154. See Thomas I, 165 F.3d at 703-05. 
155. Thomas /, 165 F.3d at 707 (stating that Thomas's takings claim was based on his 
right to exclude others from his property). The Supreme Court adheres to a per se rule of 
compensation for physical takings because landowners are entitled to exclusive possession of 
their property . Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982). 
156. Thomas I, 165 F.3d at 696. 
1 57. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.240 (Michie 2003) (making it unlawful "(1) to refuse to 
sell, lease, or rent the real property to a person because of sex, marital status . . . .  (2) to 
discriminate against a person because of sex, marital status . . . .  "). 
158. Thomas /, 195 F.3d at 697. 
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the language of Smith159 to de te rmine whe the r a hybrid right ac tually 
e xiste d, and if so, what it e ntaile d.160 In seek ing the c orrec t path, the 
Ninth Circ uit re lie d  he avily on Justice Soute r' s  c ritique of hybrid 
rights in his Lukumi c onc urre nce .161 The c ourt agree d with Justice 
Soute r  that the right c ould not re st on an inde pe nde ntly viable c laim 
standard162 or be trigge re d e ve ry time some othe r right was 
implic ate d.163 F or re asons be fore me ntione d, the forme r would re nde r 
the F ree Exe rc ise Clause moot and the latte r  would swallow the rule 
in Smith.164 
In an atte mpt to work around the se two e xtre me s, the c ourt 
dec ide d to use a "c olorable c laim" standard as a type of middle 
ground.165 U nde r the c ourt' s the ory, the c ompanion c laim must be 
c olorable , or "see mingly valid and ge nuine ,"166 me aning that it must 
have a fair probability or like lihood of succe ss on the me rits.167 The 
Ninth Circ uit dec ide d that this the ory was the most faithful to 
Supre me Court language bec ause unde r the me re implic ation the ory, 
Smith itse lf would have bee n  a hybrid c ase ,168 and unde r the 
inde pe nde ntly viable right the ory, c ase s suc h as Yoder would have 
faile d.169 F urthe rmore , the c ourt found the c olorable c laim standard to 
be pe rfec t for the se c once rns bec ause unde r the the ory, Smith' s  c laim 
would still fail to invoke a hybrid right while c ase s suc h as Yoder 
would have succee de d.11° Applying this Swanson-like standard, the 
c ourt found that the tak ings c laim was c olorable and that a hybrid 
159. The Ninth Circuit also described the Supreme Court's guidance on the matter as 
"less than precise" and "rather cryptic." Id. at 703. 
160. Id. 
161. Id. ;  see supra note 135 and accompanying text. 
162 Id. at 704 ("[T]he Supreme Court's repeated references to the Free Exercise Clause 
in the so-called hybrid cases leave us with little doubt that, whatever else it did, the Court 
did not rest its decisions in those cases upon the recognition of independently viable free 
speech and substantive due process rights."). 
163. Id. at 705 ("Government action will almost always 'implicate' a host of 
constitutional rights, even though it does not seriously threaten, much less violate, any of 
them. Hence, under a permissive 'implication' standard, rarely if ever would a neutral, 
generally applicable law be subject to the general rule of Smith."). 
164. See supra notes 135-138 and accompanying text. 
165. Thomas I, 165 F.3d at 705. In doing so, the court recognized that the colorable 
claim standard lacked the "exactitude" of the implicated or independently viable approach. 
So, it would require courts "to make difficult, qualitative, case-by-case judgments." Id. 
166. Id. (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 449 (1986)). 
167. Id. at 707. 
168. Id. at 706. 
169. Id. at 706-07. 
170. Id. at 707 ("[A]mong the potential approaches to hybrid rights, only a colorable­
claim standard accounts both for Smith (which an implication standard cannot) and for the 
original hybrid cases (which an independently-viable-rights standard cannot)."). 
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right existed.171 Applying stric t  sc rutiny, the c ourt further found that 
the burden on the landlords was substantial and that the burden was 
not j ustified by a c ompelling state interest.172 
Although this c olorable c laim standard is the best attempt so far 
made by c ourts to legitimately interpret Smith's hybrid exc eption, the 
approac h  is far from substantively perfec t and also presents 
proc edural c hallenges.173 As the Thomas I c ourt pointed out, the 
approac h  requires judges to undertak e  diffic ult ad hoc balanc ing in 
order to interpret the merit of the c ompanion c laim ac ting in 
c onjunc tion with the Free Exerc ise Clause.174 Furthermore, the 
approac h  seemingly treats any c olorable c ompanion c laim the same 
and mak es no attempt to explain why the Court singled out c ertain 
types of First Amendment and parental right c laims in Smith.175 
The main problem with the c olorable c laim approac h  is that it will 
often be impossible to distinguish it from the independently viable 
c laim approac h bec ause there is no standard fo r what amounts to a 
"genuine" or c olorable c laim. A c laim is either viable or it is not, but 
what is the c orrec t standard for something in between? For example, it 
is diffic ult to read Swanson and see how the c olorable c laim approac h  
is meaningfully distinguishable from the First Circ uit' s  approac h  in 
Brown.176 The differenc e between an "independently viable" c laim 
and a "genuine" c laim might often prove hard to rec ogniz e and it is 
easy to see the two seemingly distinc t standards j oining together to 
form one blurry, malleable standard. Bec ause of this danger, all of the 
problems inherent in the independently viable c laim approac h  are also 
potentially present in the c olorable c laim approac h.177 
There is also a c onc ern that presents itself in the c olorable c laim 
approac h  that is distinc t from the problems of the independently 
171. Id. at 708-09. 
172. Id. at 714. In a spirited dissent, Judge Hawkins expressed his belief that Smith's 
language was dicta best to be ignored and that he would have followed the Sixth Circuit's 
lead. Id at 722-24 (Hawkins, J., dissenting). Unfortunately, the Ninth Circuit's Thomas I 
opinion has been withdrawn and the en bane court never reached the issue of the proper role 
of hybrid rights in Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence. It would have been highly instructive 
to have the scope of the Smith exception addressed by eleven judges sitting en bane as 
opposed to the typical three-judge panel. Nonetheless, Judge O'Scannlain's original opinion 
stands out as the most comprehensive judicial review of what exactly the hybrid exception in 
Smith actually means and should prove to be instructive to future courts and scholars alike. 
173. See Thomas I, 165 F.3d at 705. 
174. Id. 
175. See Employment Div. Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882 (1990). This 
fact could be important because Justice Scalia's opinion plainly states that in Smith the 
claimants presented a "free exercise claim unconnected with any communicative activity or 
parental right." Id. 
176. See generally Swanson v. Gutherie Indep. Sch. Dist., 135 F.3d 694 (10th Cir. 1998). 
177. See supra Section I.C. 
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vi able approac h. In Smith, the Court stated that there was no hybri d  
c lai m presented i n  the c ase bec ause the c lai mant's f ree exerci se c lai m 
was "unc onnec ted wi th any c ommunic ati ve ac ti vi ty or parental 
ri ght."178 Thi s specific language, the sc ope of whic h i s  of ten i gnored by 
c ourts,179 deserves some di sc ussi on.180 Notic e that Smith di d not say 
that there was no hybri d  c lai m bec ause the f ree exerci se c lai m was 
unc onnec ted wi th any constitutional right. Instead, i t  i s  lack of a 
c ommunic ati ve ac ti vi ty or a parental ri ght i n  c onjunc ti on wi th the f ree 
exerci se c lai m that c auses the c lai mants to f ai l.181 Courts that use a 
c olorable c lai m standard do not look solely f or a c ommunic ati ve 
ac ti vi ty or parental ri ght i n  exami ni ng the c ompani on c lai m, however, 
but are i nstead open to exami ni ng any other c onsti tuti onal ri ght.182 
Thi s approac h  i s  somewhat i nc onsi stent wi th the Supreme Court's 
language as well as wi th the c ases the Court ci ted to i llustrate hybri d  
ri ghts.183 But if hybri d  ri ghts are only to apply to f ree exerci se c lai ms 
ac ti ng i n  c onjunc ti on wi th c ommunic ati ve ac ti vi ty or parental ri ghts, 
the obvi ous questi on that f ollows i s  why? What mak es those specific 
ri ghts so i ntertwi ned wi th the Free Exerci se Clause that they should be 
pri vi leged to some f avored c onsti tuti onal status? P art II of thi s Note 
of fers at least a parti al answer to these questi ons. 
II. THE VIGOR OF THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE ACTING IN 
CONJUNCTION WITH PARENTAL RIGHTS 
In order to understand the i mportanc e  of parents' ri ght to di rec t 
the reli gi ous upbri ngi ng of thei r c hi ldren, one must appreci ate the 
tensi on that of ten develops between mi nori ty f ai ths and public 
educ ati on. Sc hools, whic h apply fi rm rules and regulati ons, wi ll 
i nvari ably c ome i n  c onflic t wi th reli gi ous prac tic e, whic h also of ten 
requi res stric t adherenc e  to ri tual. Sec ti on II.A shows how the nati on's 
enduri ng c ommi tment to both public educ ati on and reli gi on has 
resulted i n  a c onsti tuti onal juri sprudenc e that mandates speci al 
sc ruti ny when those two c ommi tments c olli de. Sec ti on 11.B outli nes 
the test c om:ts must use when resolvi ng suc h c onf lic ts. 
178. Smith, 494 U.S. at 882. 
179. See, e.g., Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 165 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1999). 
180. This language will be further discussed in this Note in Part II when the proper 
scope of hybrid rights is examined. 
181. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 882. 
182. The potential problem is evident in examining the takings claim in Thomas. See 
Thomas I, 165 F.3d at 708-09. This problem does not present itself when the court uses an 
independently viable claim approach because the Free Exercise Clause essentially does no 
work in those cases. So, the independent claim, if successful, would be successful regardless 
of whether or not the free exercise clause was attached. 
183. See supra Section I.A. 
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A. Public School Policies Clashing with Free Exercise 
The ve ry nature of pare nts' ri ght to di rec t  the re li gi ous e duc ati on 
of thei r c hi ldre n re qui re s speci al sc ruti ny. Fe w would di spute that 
re li gi ous li be rty184 and a c ommi tme nt to public e duc ati on185 are two of 
the most i mportant goals of Ame ric a's de moc rac y. Our de voti on to 
e duc ati on i s  e vi de nt i n  mandatory sc hooli ng laws, but i t  i s  bec ause of 
thi s unwave ri ng de te rmi nati on to e duc ate Ame ric an c hi ldre n  that 
re li gi ous value s  are at stake . The ulti mate c atc h-22 i s  to te ll a pare nt 
that of c ourse he r c hi ld wi ll be e duc ate d, but he r re li gi on must suffe r 
at the whi ms of sc hool admi ni strators.186 If a pare nt c annot pay for 
pri vate e duc ati on, the gove rnme nt e ffec ti ve ly make s the deci si on 
be twee n e duc ati on and re li gi on for the pare nt vi a mandatory 
sc hooli ng laws. Although sc hools typic ally are se nsi ti ve to re li gi ous 
c onvic ti ons, e speci ally maj ori ty re li gi ons, a hybri d  ri ght i s  e speci ally 
i mportant to safe guard mi nori ty re li gi ons. The nee d  for a more 
stri nge nt F ree Exe rci se Clause - or at le ast a c lose r  e xami nati on by 
c ourts of the c onflic ti ng i nte re sts at stake -i s  e sse nti al whe n mi nori ty 
re li gi ous fai ths are thre ate ne d.187 
Consi de r the rece nt orde al of Nashala He rn, an e le ve n-ye ar-old, 
si xth-grade gi rl i n  Oklahoma. Nashala i s  Musli m, and he r re li gi on 
re qui re s he r to we ar a he adsc arf known as a hi j ab. Ini ti ally, he r sc hool 
see me d  to have no c omplai nts wi th the hi jab, but on Se pte mbe r 11, 
2003, she was summone d  to the pri nci pal' s  office and he r pare nts we re 
c alle d and told that Nashala must re move he r he adsc arf.188 He r 
pare nts re fuse d and Nashala was suspe nde d.189 The sc hool di stric t' s  
184. See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 612 (1961) (Brennan, J., concurring and 
dissenting) ("For religious freedom - the freedom to believe and to practice strange and, it 
may be, foreign creeds - has classically been one of the highest values of our society."). 
Id. 
185. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). The Court stated: 
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments. 
Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both 
demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society. It is 
required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the 
armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument 
in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and 
in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. 
186. Cf Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 616 (1961) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (lamenting that by 
denying an exemption from a Sunday closing law to a Jewish business, the Court's decision 
"compels an Orthodox Jew to choose between his religious faith and his economic survival. 
It is a choice which I think no State can constitutionally demand."). 
187. See McConnell, supra note 14, at 1132 (arguing that prior to Smith, the Free 
Exercise Clause allowed courts to grant "minority religions the same degree of solicitude 
that more mainstream religions are able to attain through the political process."). 
188. Sheila K. Stogsdill, Scarf causes controversy; Muslim student draws attention to 
suspension, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Oct. 10, 2003, at 1-A. 
189. Nashala was suspended for five more days upon her return to school. Id. 
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attorne y  the n informe d he r pare nts that she would not be allowe d  
bac k  at sc hool as long as she c ontinue d to we ar the hijab bec ause the 
sc hool, in orde r  to re duce gang ac tivity, had imple me nte d a ban on 
he adwe ar.190 This is the most vulgar of ultimatums -e ithe r your c hild 
c an rece ive a public e duc ation or she c an c ontinue to f aithfully 
prac tice he r re ligion, but not both. Putting aside any c once rn that the 
sc hool's ac tion against the Muslim girl ee rily took place on Se pte mbe r 
1 1 ,  the re are othe r fundame ntal issue s at stake he re .191 
Why not fo rce an unwilling sc hool to re asonably e xamine a re que st 
f or a re ligious e xe mption unde r  the F ree Exe rc ise 
Clause ?192Assumi ng, arguendo, that Oklahoma state law pe rmitte d the 
sc hool to infringe on Nashala's free e xe rc ise and the sc hool's ac tions 
we re not re ligiously motivate d, he r only imme diate rec ourse was to 
sue unde r fe de ral law. But without a hybrid pare ntal right, Smith's 
ge ne ral ruling would prohibit any re dre ss from this ge ne rally 
applic able law. Plac ing aside the c onstitutional infirmity that would 
re sult in suc h  a misre ading of Smith and Yoder, this see ms c omple te ly 
illogic al. The be st solution le ave s  both the sc hool's polic y  and 
Nashala's re ligion c omple te ly intac t - simply rec ognize that the 
polic y  re mains in place while simultane ously rec ogniz ing that Nashala 
must be give n a re ligious e xe mption. 
In c ase s like Nashala's,193 whe re free e xe rc ise rights are e spec ially 
thre ate ne d, one c an see the e nduring nee d f or some type of 
c onstitutional pare ntal right to direc t c hildre n's re ligious upbringing. 
To c omple te ly re ad out hybrid rights is to de stroy the le gac y of Yoder 
and Pierce's c harte r that pare nts have a fundame ntal right unde r the 
F ree Exe rc ise Clause of the F irst Ame ndme nt to shape the ir c hildre n's 
re ligious upbringing. 
190. Id. 
191. Interestingly, the school's attorney implied that he was ignoring arguments from 
the girl's parents that the ban violated the Religious Freedom and Restoration Act because 
the Supreme Court in Boerne deemed the applicable portions of the Act unconstitutional. 
See id. But that ignores the fact that Oklahoma has its own Religious Freedom Act and 
Nashala's case falls directly within the Act's jurisdiction. See 51 OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 253 
(2002). 
192. In Nashala's case, it is obvious that she was not wearing the hijab as part of gang­
related activity and absent some other justification, it was unreasonable for the school not to 
grant her an exemption. 
193. Fortunately for Nashala, the United States Department of Justice intervened in her 
father's lawsuit against the Muskogee public school district and the parties settled the case 
with the school district agreeing to allow Nashala to wear her hijab until she graduates. The 
school district also agreed to establish a process through which students could request 
religious exemptions from the dress code. See Press Release, United States Department of 
Justice, Justice Department Reaches Settlement Agreement With Oklahoma School District 
in Muslim Student Headscarf Case (May 19, 2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/ 
2004/May/04_crt_343.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2005). 
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B. The Proper Standard for Courts to Use When Addressing 
Parents' Hybrid Rights Claims 
2237 
The basic pre mise of c irc uit c ourts that have acce pte d  the 
possibility of hybrid rights is that whe n a hybrid right is suffic ie ntly 
e stablishe d, a c ourt must use pre -Smith stric t sc rutiny in rev ie wing the 
c laim.194 The misc once ption of this pre mise arise s from the te rm "stric t  
sc rutiny." The truth is that free e xe rc ise c halle nge s neve r re ally 
rece ive d stric t sc rutiny,195 insofar as the te rm has bee n unde rstood in 
e qual protec tion c halle nge s  base d on race , whe re - at le ast until 
rece ntly - many c onside re d  it stric t in the ory but fatal in fac t.196 The 
re al te st was more ak in to some type of inte rme diate sc rutiny, 
re quiring not a c ompe lling gove rnme nt inte re st, but rathe r an inte re st 
of the "highe st orde r"197 or a "substantial" gove rnme nt inte re st.198 
Othe r  c omme ntators have acc urate ly state d  that the pre -Smith free 
e xe rc ise te st use d by the Court was e sse ntially the same te st use d by 
the Court in free speec h c ase s arising unde r United States v. O'Brien.199 
The O'Brien te st mandate s  that if a ge ne rally applic able law re gulating 
c onduc t has an inc ide ntal e ffec t  on speec h, the gove rnme nt must show 
a substantial inte re st that must be balance d against the c halle nge r's 
speec h inte re sts to e nsure that the "inc ide ntal re stric tion on alle ge d  
First Ame ndme nt free doms is no gre ate r  than e sse ntial" to furthe r the 
194. See, e.g. , Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist., 135 F.3d 694, 699 (10th Cir. 1998) 
(recognizing the argument that a valid hybrid rights claim requires the court to review the 
claim under Yoder's standard). 
195. See Geoffrey R. Stone, A Structural Overview and an Appraisal of Recent 
Developments: Constitutionally Compelled Exemptions and the Free Exercise Clause, 27 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 985, 994 (1986) ("The Court frequently states that laws having even an 
incidental effect on religious activity must pass strict scrutiny. If one looks to the Court's 
results rather than to its rhetoric, however, one sees that the actual scrutiny is often far from 
strict."). 
196. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 507 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring) 
("Indeed, the failure of legislative action to survive strict scrutiny has led some to wonder 
whether our review of racial classifications has been strict in theory, but fatal in fact."). In 
fact, it is rare for the Court to allow any racial classification to stand when challenged under 
the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection prong. But see Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 
306, 326-27 (2003) ("Although all governmental uses of race are subject to strict scrutiny, not 
all are invalidated by it."). 
197. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972). 
198. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 462 (1971). 
199. See James D. Gordon Ill, Free Exercise on the Mountaintop, 79 CAL. L. REV. 91, 
105-06 ("[I)n the free exercise cases the Court has articulated the requisite governmental 
interest in various ways. In practice, however, the Court has essentially applied the O'Brien 
test."); McConnell, supra note 14, at 1 139 (writing that the O'Brien test is "virtually identical 
to the free exercise exemptions test, once it is stripped of overblown language about 
'compelling' interests"). 
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government's interest.200 O'Brien, which involved a man who burned 
his draft card in protest, demonstrates the explicit need for religious 
exemptions in the world of public education, even more so than in 
content regulating laws that have incidental affects on speech. After 
all, even if O'Brien could not burn his draft card, he had many more 
alternative ways to protest the draft. Nashala Hern, however, was 
effectively prevented from practicing her religion while simultaneously 
receiving a public education unless an exemption was mandated.201 
In the context of free exercise exemptions, the equivalent test was 
stated in Braunfeld v. Brown: if the state enacts a generally applicable 
law, "the purpose and effect of which is to advance the State's secular 
goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect burden on religious 
observance unless the State may accomplish its purpose by means 
which do not impose such a burden. "202 At first blush this test sounds 
quite demanding. But in application, the Braunfield Court denied an 
exemption from a Sunday closing law to a Jewish merchant because it: 
might well undermine the State's goal of providing a day that, as best 
possible, eliminates the atmosphere of commercial noise and activity . . . .  
[And] enforcement problems would be more difficult since there would 
be two or more days to police rather than one and it would be more 
difficult to observe whether violations were occurring.203 
In practice, this test does not always mandate exemptions, showing 
that more rigid free exercise protection does not in fact make each 
individual a law unto him or herself.204 Instead, a court must properly 
weigh the state's interest, the individual's free exercise interest, and 
the means the state uses to advance its interest. Like nearly all the 
rights listed in the Bill of Rights, the Free Exercise Clause marks a 
"boundary between the powers of the government and the freedom of 
individuals," and that boundary is defined and ultimately policed by 
the courts.205 Because the court - as an arm of the government - is 
the ultimate arbiter of what the law is, one can be sure that the 
"individual believer is not judge in his own case."206 
Furthermore, it is important to understand that the issue is not a 
zero-sum game of continued enforcement or granting exemptions. 
Instead, a request for a free exercise exemption is more akin to an "as 
200. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). In O'Brien, the Court found 
that O'Brien's conviction for burning his draft card could stand because the government met 
its burden. Id. 
201. See supra notes 189-192 and accompanying text. 
202. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961). 
203. Id. at 608. 
204. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text. 
205. McConnell, supra note 14, at 1150. 
206. Id. 
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applied" constitutional challenge - the general validity of the law is 
not challenged, the law is simply challenged as applied to the religious 
objector.207 If the exemption is granted, the law remains in force, just 
not for the individuals granted religious exemptions. 
Also, the interest of the government must be properly narrowed.208 
In the context of parental hybrid exceptions, this means that the Court 
will not accept a "sweeping claim" that "education is so compelling 
that even . . .  established religious practices . . .  must give way."209 
Instead, "[w]here fundamental claims of religious freedom are at stake 
. . .  [the Court] must searchingly examine the interests that the State 
seeks to promote . . . and the impediment to those objectives that 
would flow" if the State did grant the requested exemption.210 So the 
precise government interest to be weighed is the more narrow interest 
in not granting the exemption.211 In Yoder, for example, after stating 
that courts "must move with great circumspection" when balancing a 
state's interest with claims for religious exemptions,212 the Court found 
that the strong Amish interests at stake entitled the parents to an 
exemption because the State failed to show how its "admittedly strong 
interest in compulsory education would be adversely affected by 
granting an exemption to the Amish."213 
With this proper understanding of how free exercise exemptions 
worked prior to Smith, it is far easier to see how courts could 
effectively implement the standard in present day hybrid cases. Such 
an approach would also be consistent with the two policy evils that 
Smith attempts to curtail. First, as discussed above, each parent would 
not be a law unto him- or herself. To the contrary, judges would 
simply evaluate parental claims to ensure that they state a sufficient 
hybrid right and then decide if the school has a sufficient interest in 
not granting the exemption. In the case of Nashala Hern, for example, 
207. Id. at 1138 ("[T]he concept of an 'as applied' challenge to a law is a precise 
parallel."). 
208. See Employment Div. Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 909-10 (1990) 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("It is not the State's broad interest in fighting the critical 'war on 
drugs' that must be weighed against respondents' claim, but the State's narrow interest in 
refusing to make an exception for the religious, ceremonial use of peyote."). Although 
Justice Blackmun dissented in Smith on the grounds of whether pre-Smith scrutiny should 
apply, his view of what constituted a state's interest was accurate. See, e.g., Thomas v. 
Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 719 (1981) (stating that the interests 
advanced by the state must be "properly narrowed"). 
209. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972). 
210. Id. 
211 .  As Justice Blackmun pointed out in his dissent in Smith, failure to properly balance 
the interest in this way "tends to distort the weighing process in the State's favor." Smith, 494 
U.S. at 910 (Blackmun, J., dissenting on other grounds). 
212. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 235. 
213. Id. at 236 (emphasis added). 
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it seems reasonable to suppose that a judge would have found that the 
centrality of the headscarf to the Muslim faith is of great significance 
- in the words of Yoder, central to the religion's "way of life." At the 
same time, while the government surely has a substantial interest in 
preventing gang violence, it is difficult to claim that it has a substantial 
interest in not granting this specific exemption - at least not until a 
hijab becomes common gang fashion. This example illustrates how 
most exemptions in this context are easily created and administered 
while not negatively impacting the substantive polices the school is 
attempting to implement. 
Of course, this still requires federal judges to balance the two 
interests - a process that Smith suggests is "horrible."214 But 
balancing interests is central to the role of judges in a democracy 
where individual rights and the public powers of the State often 
collide.215 There is no reason to think that judges are somehow less 
equipped to undertake this judicial task when the issue at stake is the 
free exercise of religion and the adverse parties are a school and 
parent. Furthermore, the careful weighing of interests in this context is 
exactly what Yoder endorses and mandates.216 
CONCLUSION 
The debate over hybrid rights is not yet over.217 Hopefully, the 
Supreme Court will revisit its somewhat infamous Smith language and 
give lower courts further guidance in how to address this difficult 
214. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890 n.5 . Although per se rules should be deemed favorable to 
balancing tests, it seems odd that the Court in this case favored a per se rule against free 
exercise considering the plain constitutional text mandates "no law" prohibiting the free 
exercise of religion. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
215. See David L. Faigman, Constitutional Adventures in Wonderland: Exploring the 
Debate Between Rules and Standards Through the Looking Glass of the First Amendment, 44 
HASTINGS L.J. 829, 838 (1993). Faigman states: 
[B]ecause rules are a function of the clash between majoritarian values and individual 
liberty, the Court must assume the responsibility for making the difficult choices along the 
constitutional frontier. Inevitably, therefore, when the Constitution is implicated, the Court 
must weigh the social importance of the government action against the value of individual 
liberty infringed by that action. 
Id. Balancing is the most common process through which judges solve the "Madisonian 
dilemma," which can be understood as the clash between majority and minority tyranny, 
where "neither the majority nor the minority can be trusted to define the freedom of the 
other." Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. 
L.J. 1, 3 (1971). 
216. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 235 ("This should suggest that courts must move with great 
circumspection in performing the sensitive and delicate task of weighing a State's legitimate 
social concern when faced with religious claims for exemption from generally applicable 
educational requirements."). 
217. This is evident from the wide disparity and confusion of Circuit Courts addressing 
the issue. 
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question. For the time being, however, federal courts would be wise to 
not shrink from Smith's language, but instead wrestle with it and treat 
parental free exercise claims with the respect they have been given in 
the past century of Supreme Court jurisprudence. 
The true fear is that minority religions will not receive the same 
protections afforded to the more traditional "American" religions.218 
The Free Exercise Clause used to act as a judicial checkpoint in this 
regard. After Smith, many lower courts have acted as if this is no 
longer so. But in those special hybrid rights instances, such as the 
parental right to direct the religious upbringing of a child, there is still 
reason to hope that courts will warm to the idea that it is their 
responsibility to fashion a public education system most faithful to the 
Constitution - one that recognizes and embraces the pluralistic 
society deeply anchored in America's history and tradition. 
218. This is most likely because of legislatures' general ignorance to minority faiths, as 
opposed to a specific intent to infringe on one's free exercise. The fact that the House voted 
unanimously in favor of RFRA and the Senate approved RFRA by a vote of 97-3 reinforces 
this point. See Douglas Laycock & Oliver S. Thomas, Interpreting the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act, 73 TEX. L. REV. 209, 210 (1994). 
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